Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz released a highly anticipated report on Thursday exposing critical details about the FBI’s handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) leading up to the January 6, 2021, breach at the U.S. Capitol. The report confirms that while the FBI officially assigned only three confidential sources to monitor the events of January 6, more than two dozen FBI CHS were in the crowd that day.

The bombshell report raises new questions about the scope of the FBI’s involvement in the intelligence-gathering process and its ability to assess and respond to the events that transpired during the certification of the Electoral College vote

Horowitz’s investigation examined the FBI’s use of confidential informants and its broader intelligence collection efforts as federal agencies prepared for January 6. While the FBI had recognized the potential for violence, the Inspector General revealed a significant lapse in how information from informants was managed and shared with other law enforcement partners.

“The FBI did not canvass its field offices in advance of January 6, 2021, to identify any intelligence, including CHS reporting, about potential threats to the January 6 Electoral Certification,” the report states. Deputy Director Paul Abbate, who was Associate Deputy Director at the time, called this omission a “basic step that was missed.”

While only three confidential sources were officially tasked to monitor the rally, the report found that 26 confidential sources—spread across multiple FBI field offices—were present at the Capitol grounds. The majority attended of their own volition or due to pre-existing reporting assignments unrelated to January 6.

The report further reveals that among these sources:

• Four entered the Capitol during the breach.
• Thirteen entered restricted areas surrounding the Capitol building.
• The remaining nine did not enter any prohibited zones.

“We determined that of the 26 CHSs who were in DC on January 6 in connection with the events of January 6, 4 entered the Capitol during the riot; an additional 13 entered the restricted area around the Capitol, which was a security perimeter established in preparation for the January 6 Electoral Certification; and 9 neither entered a restricted area nor entered the Capitol or otherwise engaged in illegal activity. None of the CHSs who entered the Capitol or a restricted area has been prosecuted to date,” the report continues.

None of the FBI’s confidential sources were authorized to commit or encourage unlawful activity, and the report found no evidence suggesting that FBI sources incited violence or played an organizing role in the day’s events.

However, the Inspector General’s findings expose gaps in how intelligence from these sources was collected, analyzed, and shared. Horowitz noted that while individual field offices did obtain valuable reporting from sources—such as discussions of plans to “form a perimeter” around the Capitol or references to “storming the building”—this intelligence was not effectively relayed to the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO) or other law enforcement partners.

In the aftermath of the Capitol breach, FBI officials initially told Congress that the Bureau had taken extraordinary steps to prepare for January 6. Yet Horowitz’s findings contradict that narrative, describing the FBI’s pre-event posture as reactive rather than proactive. Intelligence products specific to the Capitol certification were never issued, despite similar assessments being created for the January 20 inauguration.